
Risk Creep
November 2016 Investment Report
Summary
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Risk creep is a gradual but increasingly dangerous increase of risk caused by systematic self-delusion on the part of experts tasked with risk control. Gillian Tett of the Financial Times wrote recently that the central banks are ignoring numerous warning signs of elevated risk that may echo 2008.
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Deutsche Bank's derivative exposure is 55.6tn Euro's compared to annual German GDP of 2.7tn Euro's.
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A derivatives investment loss of a mere 4% would mean that six major US banks might be totally wiped out.
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Average house prices have just reached a multiple of eight times average earnings from a 1990's low of two times.
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Commodities - What should be modest price increases will turn into price spikes and even physical shortages.
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Martin Wolf, FT on Donald Trump - The effects are likely to be rising inflation, higher long-term nominal interest rates and a weak dollar. It could even generate the sort of environment seen in the 1970’s.
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M&G’s fixed interest team have forecast a potential rise in UK inflation to around 4% within six months from 1% today. Commodity, energy and food prices are increasing at a greater rate from very low levels and should continue well into the end of next year when inflation could well be approaching 8%.
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Crispin Odey - the stock market could fall by 80%.
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Charlie Munger – 'It takes character to sit there with all that cash and do nothing. I didn't get where I am by going after mediocre opportunities.'
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Warren Buffett – 'Cash combined with courage in a time of crisis is priceless.'
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Pippa Malmgren - ‘It is hard for us to recognise that the last twenty-five years were not ‘normal’. It was a privileged period of history during which we were blessed with a favourable set of circumstances. This exceptional situation is highly unlikely to be repeated.’
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Pippa Malmgren - ‘As Peter Drucker pointed out: ‘Far too many people – especially people with great expertise in one area – are contemptuous of knowledge in other areas or believe that being bright is a substitute for knowledge.’ The remedy: ‘discover where your intellectual arrogance is causing disabling ignorance and overcome it.’
Risk Creep
Risk creep is a gradual but increasingly dangerous increase of risk caused by systematic self-delusion on the part of experts tasked with risk control. Sociologist Diane Vaughan has concluded somewhat counter-intuitively that organisations staffed by smart and moral people can nevertheless slide gradually into dangerous and unethical behaviour.
In the case of the Challenger Space Shuttle explosion in 1986, the top brass of NASA actually followed the safety rules rigorously but were tragically completely wrong in their decision to launch under cold weather conditions; these particular decisions jeopardised the functioning of the rubber seals in the rocket booster fuel tanks, which failed catastrophically just after lift-off. Less senior engineers objected to the launch based on their knowledge about the effects of the cold on the seals. However, the more senior engineers that made the call at NASA went ahead because their safety protocols had been gradually degraded via a process she calls the 'normalisation of deviance'. Essentially, evidence that failure of the seals might occur was never matched by actual catastrophic failure (until Challenger). The ongoing studies of seal failure over the years established that some leaks were quite manageable, so the threshold for stopping a launch was moved up, making even somewhat damaged seals an 'acceptable' risk. Imperceptibly to the leadership, the standard of acceptable damage to the seals was gradually moved up over a period of years until failure actually did occur. No one in the hierarchy perceived that they had compromised safety, but they had in fact completely misjudged the risk.
In the case of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, a whole series of engineering errors occurred that seem inexplicable. There were actually eight major engineering errors that were made, with three of them reliably fatal. The recent movie claims that cutting corners was involved in causing the tragedy, since the rig was massively behind schedule and was experiencing huge cost over-runs. People would not knowingly risk immolation in a rig explosion, but if everything they proposed was approved by Federal regulators, then perhaps an illusion of safety permitted the gradual loosening of standards, and this was perceived psychologically as an acceptable risk. Risk creep guaranteed that eventually a catastrophe would occur when enough standards were violated to cause one.
Gillian Tett of the Financial Times wrote recently that the central banks are ignoring numerous warning signs of elevated risk that may echo 2008. She notes that No Interest Rate Policy is causing huge stress in the banking and insurance sectors, but the central bankers completely ignored the implications of this risk. As recently as the Fed's Jackson Hole conference, the subject wasn't even on the agenda. We can see some warning signs that the now-familiar tendency towards 'normalisation of deviance' may be occurring in the banking sectors in Germany and Italy, and probably elsewhere. The Italian banking system has a None Performing Loan rate of about 17%, far above that seen in the 2008 crisis in the US. Because its main line of business is investments, Deutsche Bank has a derivative book with a nominal value of about $57.7 trillion on an asset base of $2 trillion. The risk to the German and French financial systems from an Italian crisis is about $93 billion and $280 billion, respectively. Deutsche Bank's net exposure to Italy is about $13.3bn, or in fact, most of its equity. The US has little exposure to Italy (a total of $47 bn), but about $326
billion in combined exposure to Germany and France. However, if we look at the derivatives books of US banks, we see an additional exposure of $106bn to Italy. So although standard bank measures suggest US risk is nominal and German and French risk is survivable, this ignores the additional risk from derivatives books, and it ignores the fact that these are poorly known risks.
The global derivative market size is equivalent to $200,000 per person on this earth. Deutsche Bank's exposure is 55.6tn Euro's compared to annual German GDP of 2.7tn Euro's. Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America each have exposure of $45tn to $53tn. Deutsche Bank are betting 47 times more money than they have and the US banks are betting 24 times more money than they have. A derivatives investment loss of a mere 4% would mean that six major US banks might be totally wiped out.
A verdict by a California judge may have opened up a new multibillion-dollar litigation risk for Deutsche Bank. The complaint relates to 465 trusts with a total face value of about $433bn, which allegedly suffered total realised collateral losses of $75.7bn. The claimants – which include BlackRock, Pimco, TIAA and Prudential – do not specify an amount for damages, but a person familiar with their strategy said the claim could run to several billion dollars.
Signs of risk creep are everywhere in the financial system and I will again refer to the one where the majority of the population do not perceive (or want to perceive) the size of the risk, if any at all – the residential property market. Average house prices have just reached a multiple of eight times average earnings from a 1990's low of two times. As with most financial assets, this risk creep is a combination of investors reducing their estimate of by how much interest rates may rise and the probability of default – they have stopped believing that it can happen.
Real Assets
Bank of America Merrill Lynch has compiled data on financial assets (equities and bonds) and real assets (commodities, property (US not UK) and collectibles) going back to 1926. It found that the latter are cheaper, relative to the former, than at any time in this 90 year period.
Commodities
Large banks are unwilling to increase their lending against commodities collateral. This is likely to lead to much greater volatility in commodity prices, and more frequent breaks in global supply chains. What should be modest price increases will turn into price spikes and even physical shortages. The banks have the liquidity to do the lending, but many of their commodities lending staff have left. Most importantly, they now lack the willingness to increase their commodities exposure, because top management and boards believe increased commodities lending carries unacceptable political risk.
Inflation
Last year, a team of economists at Morgan Stanley headed by Charles Goodhart, a former member of the Bank of England's monetary Policy Committee, argued that the rising number of retirees would 'reverse three multi-decade trends' by reducing inequality, pushing up yields and raising equilibrium growth rates. Both the young and old are inflationary for the economy, ' they said. It is only the working age population that is deflationary.' With the working age population shrinking, inflation could return.
Martin Wolf, FT – ‘Mr Trump’s populism and the Republican’s tax-cutting mania might open up large and permanent increases in fiscal deficits. This would then pose a big challenge for the US Federal Reserve. The obvious response would be to tighten monetary policy. Mr Trump has indicated he favours this. But he has also suggested the economy should grow at close to 4% a year. That seems impossible given the slow growth of the labour force. Yet when choosing a replacement for Janet Yellen, Fed chair, by 2018, Mr Trump might look for someone who would run monetary policy on the assumption that such growth was feasible. The result would be the classic populist blend of ultra-loose fiscal policy and monetary policies. The effects are likely to be rising inflation, higher long-term nominal interest rates and a weak dollar. That might mark a transformation in the global monetary regime. It could even generate the sort of environment seen in the 1970’s, when President Richard Nixon and Arthur Burns, Fed chairman, were in charge.’
Donald Trump, whose financial supporters have included Wall Street banks, has proposed the repeal of Dodd-Frank (an Act to promote financial stability and end ‘too big to fail’). This would potentially unleash the excess capital that Trump requires to meet his big surge of spending on infrastructure and as Richard Koo of Nomura has previously identified could lead to inflation of 1600% (an average of 10% per annum over 26 years).
M&G’s fixed interest team have forecast a potential rise in UK inflation to around 4% within six months from 1% today. Commodity, energy and food prices are increasing at a greater rate from very low levels and should continue well into the end of next year when inflation could well be approaching 8%, which would be the highest level for 26 years. All financial assets are priced around the expectation of low interest rates and would have to be revalued significantly lower with such high rates of inflation and interest rates.
Crispin Odey – 'The FTSE 100 share index is now up 30% over five years, whilst earnings have fallen 80%. On an earnings yield of 1.6%, the stock market could fall by 80% and, provided profits did not fall, would be on a 13x p/e (price/earnings) multiple. The Bank of England is proud that they have engineered such a pleasant result but there is now increasing evidence that this is unsustainable. We are now destined to have a recession in the UK as well as inflation. It will be difficult for the stock market to remain above all of this. What QE (Quantitative Easing) has done is to make investors complacent but also optimistic that only an upturn in economic activity, spelling higher profits could trigger upward interest rates. What the UK is promising is rising wages, recession, inflation and falling profits. Not exactly the prize the ticket holders in the FTSE and the gilt market have paid up for.'
Cash
John Phelan - “If you go back and study the great investors throughout history – the Medicis, the Morgan’s, the Rothschild’s, and recently Buffett – these great investors with terrific records share a common trait: they were always in a position to be liquidity providers. Each was willing to hold cash until someone was in distress or under duress, and they could provide liquidity at attractive prices.'
Warren Buffett – 'Holding cash is uncomfortable, but not as uncomfortable as doing something stupid'
Bernard Baruch – 'I have found it wise, in fact, to periodically turn into cash most of my holdings and virtually retire from the market. No general keeps his troops fighting all the time, nor does he go into battle without some of his forces held back in
reserve'
Warren Buffett – 'There will be some incident, it could be tomorrow. At that time, you need cash. Cash at that time is like oxygen. When you don't need it, it's the only thing you need. We operate from a level of liquidity that no one else does'.
Seth Klarman – 'Unfortunately the important criterion of investment merit is obscured or lost when substandard investments are acquired solely to remain fully invested'
Bruce Berkowitz – 'Fairholme views market crashes, panics, and downturns as opportunities to buy more of the companies we love at fire sale prices. The only way to exploit these opportunities is to have cash on hand'
Bruce Berkowitz – 'Naysayers argue that holding a large amount of cash that yields nearly nothing is foolish, and perhaps it is – until it isn't. On all counts, we think it's better to have cash and not need it, rather than to need it and not have it'.
Charlie Munger – 'There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn't awash in cash – and I don't want to go back'.
Gregg Powers – 'I'd much rather apologise for holding cash than for paying too much'
Charlie Munger – 'It takes character to sit there with all that cash and do nothing. I didn't get where I am by going after mediocre opportunities.'
Warren Buffett – 'Cash combined with courage in a time of crisis is priceless.'
Peter Cundill – 'I have always loved cash – if you've got lots of it you will never have to pass up a great opportunity.'
Recommended reading – ‘Signals’ by Pippa Malmgren
‘Being right early means selling when prices are still rising. To be right early means underperforming and therefore to risk losing clients and one’s job’
‘It is hard for us to recognise that the last twenty-five years were not ‘normal’. It was a privileged period of history during which we were blessed with a favourable set of circumstances. This exceptional situation is highly unlikely to be repeated.’
‘What does the artificially low and subsidised price of money tell us about the future? It seeks to lure the public into borrowing and making investments, which they would not otherwise do. It seeks to make the public take a bet on asset prices and the future. No price can be more important than the price of money itself. Government intervention to suppress interest rates perverts the bond market, which has serious consequences. Government bonds are supposed to constitute the risk-free rate of return against which all other investments are measured and judged.’
‘As Peter Drucker pointed out: ‘Far too many people – especially people with great expertise in one area – are contemptuous of knowledge in other areas or believe that being bright is a substitute for knowledge.’ The remedy: ‘discover where your intellectual arrogance is causing disabling ignorance and overcome it.’
Recommended Films:-
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‘Money for Nothing: Inside the Federal Reserve’ – Jim Bruce
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‘Boom, Bust and Boom Again’ – Terry Jones
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‘The Big Short’
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‘Requiem for the American Dream’
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The views reflected herein are those of Vertis Private Wealth Management Limited and should not be regarded as a recommendation to invest in any one product or service; before investing you should always consider personal investment advice.
Where you seek the advice of Vertis Private Wealth Management Limited we continually monitor markets and will advise you where there is a change in the findings of our research and provide advice and guidance on any alterations that may be required to the investment strategy that we have previously recommended.
Vertis Private Wealth Management Limited does not accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or its contents. Investors should be aware that the value and income from investments can rise and fall and that past performance should not be considered as a guide to the future.